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RECENT DECISIONS
CHARITIES-TRUsTs-TRusT PROVISION FOR THE CARE AND
COMFORT OF DUMB ANIMAL.-Bertha L. Hamilton provided in her
Will that her homestead property be used "for the purposes of an
animal home or hospital," as a trust committee may decide; the re-
mainder of her estate and the income therefrom was to be used "for
the care and comfort of such animals." The residuary estate of the
testatrix exceeds $400,000 in value. The trust is attacked on the
grounds that it is not for a charitable purpose as provided by
statute in New York and is therefore void under the rule against
perpetuities.
Held, the trust as set up by Bertha Hamilton is for a charitable
purpose, since the care of animals is generally beneficial to mankind.
Matter of Hamilton, 270 App. Div. 634, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 265 (3d
Dep't 1946).
Charitable trusts are exempt from the provisions of the rules
against perpetuities.1 There is one question, then, in this case,
namely whether or not the provisions in Bertha Hamilton's will are
charitable. In forming its decision, the court used the Restatement
of the Law of Trusts as its only authority,2 being unable to find a
precedent in New York. The decision is in accord with the weight
of authority, as there have been similar decisions in England 3 and
in other jurisdictions of the United States,4 which have upheld trusts
for the care and comfort of animals as charitable. There also have
been decisions upholding trusts for the prevention of cruelty to
animals 5 as well as trusts which indirectly benefit animals. 6 The
text writers have agreed with this trend of decisions in designating
as charitable, trusts for the care of animals.7
I N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12; N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 113.
2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 374. "A trust for the promotion of purposes
which are of a character sufficiently beneficial to the community as to justify
permitting property to be devoted forever to their accomplishment, is chari-
table...
"Relief of Animals. A trust to prevent or alleviate the suffering of ani-
mals is charitable. Thus, a trust for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or a
trust to establish a hmne for animals, or a trust for the prevention or cure or
treatment of diseases or of injuries of animals, is charitable." (Emphasis
supplied by the court.)3 In re Wedgwood, (1915) 1 Ch. 113; In re Douglas, 25 Ch. D. 472 (1887).
4 Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 AtI. 479 (1935); McCran v. Kay,
93 N. J. Eq. 352, 115 Atl. 649 (1921).5 In re Forrester's Estate, 86 Colo. 221, 279 Pac. 721 (1929); Minns v.
Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 66 N. E. 593 (1903); Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank
and Trust Co., 214 N. C. 224, 199 S. E. 20 (1938).
6 Estate of Coleman, 167 Cal. 212, 138 Pac. 992 (1914); In re Estate of
Graves, 242 Ill. 23, 89 N. E. 672 (1909).7 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 379, "... that
human beings are the real and final beneficiaries of such trusts. It is because
these gifts tend to prevent the human degradation which comes from participa-
tion in cruelty to animals and from observing suffering among animals . . .";
Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 374.2, "Today... the purpose is recog-
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There is one case in New York" which is somewhat similar to
the case under discussion. The testatrix in that case established a
trust for her five dogs. The surrogate, after referring to many previ-
ous decisions in other jurisdictions, held it to be invalid, not because.
animals were the beneficiaries, but because it violated the rule against
perpetuities. To be considered charitable, a trust must include an
indefinite number of animals and not merely a few specified ones.
Another objection raised was that the provision of the trust
might allow money to be used in the creation or maintenance of a
haven for wild animals. Probably this objection was based on an
English decision which held that a trust to establish a game preserve
was not charitable. 9 The court reasoned that a game preserve would
benefit wild animals, and since wild animals are not beneficial to
mankind, the trust was not charitable. This distinction has been
vigorously attacked by the text writers as too narrow.10 The court in
this case dismissed the objection because the surrogate had deter-
mined that it was the intention of the testatrix to provide for the care
of domestic animals.
Presiding Justice Hill, in dissenting, argued that Section 12 of
the Personal Property Law was passed to reestablish the English
common law relating to charitable uses and no authority or text deal-
ing with the meaning of the words charitable or benevolent under
the common law of England showed that they contemplated a bene-
faction to other than the human group. He further argued that the
reasons which sustain the perpetual application of income from in-
vested funds and the use of real property for the relief and aid of
the human race do not apply to the benefaction, care and relief of
dumb animals.
The court in its result is in harmony with the majority view.
However, in its opinion, it seems to have avoided the wealth of au-
thority in other jurisdictions, and the text writers on the subject.
G. P. O.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSPIRACY - EXTORTION - CONVICTION OF
ONE DEFENDANT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ACQUITTAL OF Co-
DEFENDANT.--Appellant and a co-defendant were indicted jointly for
extortion and for conspiracy to extort. The alleged taking of money
from the proprietor of a garage by threats, was pleaded as the ex-
nized as one in which the community has an interest" (i.e., in seeing that animals
do not suffer).
s Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
9 In re Grove-Grady (1929) 1 Ch. 557.
10 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 379; Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 374.2; see More Game Birds in America, Inc. v.
Boettger, 125 N. J. L. 97, 14 A. (2d) 778 (1940).
